The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has once again extended the ban on the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) [NSCN(K)] for another five years, effective September 28, 2025. The militant outfit, along with all its factions, wings, and front organizations, has been declared an “unlawful association” under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), citing its continued involvement in activities threatening India’s sovereignty and integrity. While the government’s decision may appear as a firm stance against militancy, it also raises deeper questions about the effectiveness of repeated bans and the lack of lasting solutions to the insurgency problem in the Northeast.
According to the MHA, NSCN(K) has consistently pursued its goal of establishing a sovereign Nagaland by carving out Naga-inhabited areas across India and Myanmar. In doing so, it has aligned itself with other outlawed groups such as ULFA(I), PREPAK, and PLA. The outfit has been accused of engaging in extortion, kidnappings for ransom, possession of illegal arms, and procuring foreign assistance from anti-India forces. Between September 2020 and April 2025 alone, authorities registered 71 cases against NSCN(K) cadres, filed 56 chargesheets, and prosecuted 35 members. During the same period, 85 cadres were arrested, 69 surrendered, and 13 were killed in encounters with security forces. The recoveries paint a picture of a group well-armed and dangerous: 69 firearms, 931 live rounds, explosives, IEDs, and grenades.
The governments of Nagaland, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh have also supported the continuation of the ban, pointing out the group’s destabilizing impact on the region. For states already struggling with insurgency, smuggling, and cross-border militancy, the fear of NSCN(K) regrouping and rearming remains a pressing concern. This is not the first time NSCN(K) has faced such a ban. In fact, the organisation has been outlawed for decades, with extensions issued almost routinely every five years. Since the death of its founder, S.S. Khaplang, in 2017, leadership has shifted to his deputies, but the group continues to survive and operate, albeit weakened. The repeated extension of bans reveals the state’s determination but also its limitations. Declaring an organisation unlawful address the symptom, not the cause. Without addressing the underlying grievances of the Naga people and without ensuring development, representation, and peace dialogues, bans merely delay the inevitable resurgence of armed groups under new names and faces.
It is worth noting that while NSCN(K) faces extended prohibitions, its rival faction, NSCN(IM), remains engaged in peace talks with the Government of India. The NSCN(IM) has been negotiating for years, aiming for a political solution to the seven-decade-old Naga insurgency. This contrast reflects the dual path India continues to pursue—talks with those willing to negotiate and bans on those who resist.
As Government Extends Ban on National Socialist Council of Nagaland (K) for Five Years: A Necessary Step or a Repeated Cycle this extension of the ban on NSCN(K) for another five years reflects the government’s firm stance against insurgency and its continuing attempts to protect national security. Yet, it also reveals the larger truth that banning militant groups is only a temporary measure—it silences their operations on paper but does not erase the conditions that allow them to survive. The statistics of arrests, surrenders, and arms seizures demonstrate the government’s successes, but they also expose the persistence of an armed underground network that refuses to vanish despite decades of counterinsurgency. For the people of Nagaland and the Northeast, the real question is not about another ban but about whether peace, dignity, and stability can ever be fully restored. The long history of insurgency has left scars on generations of civilians—families who have lived under constant fear, communities forced to pay extortion, and youth caught between the state and underground outfits. Declaring NSCN(K) “unlawful” addresses the security threat but does little to heal these wounds or provide a lasting alternative for those who feel alienated from the Indian state.
The contrast between NSCN(K) and NSCN(IM) shows the two possible paths before us—violence that prolongs suffering and dialogue that, though slow, can pave the way for reconciliation. If the government truly wishes to end the cycle of insurgency, it must complement its security measures with meaningful political engagement, economic opportunities, and trust-building initiatives. Until such efforts are made with sincerity, the ban on NSCN(K) will remain just another chapter in the long cycle of prohibition and resistance, while the larger dream of peace in Nagaland remains elusive.